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Background: Cognitive biases play an important role in the formation and maintenance
of delusions. These biases are indicators of a weak reflective mind, or reduced engaging
in reflective and deliberate reasoning. In three experiments, we tested whether a bias to
accept non-sense statements as profound, treat metaphorical statements as literal, and
suppress intuitive responses is related to psychotic-like experiences.
Methods: We tested deliberate reasoning and psychotic-like experiences in the general
population and in patients with a former psychotic episode. Deliberate reasoning was
assessed with the bullshit receptivity scale, the ontological confabulation scale and the
cognitive reflection test (CRT). We also measured algorithmic performance with the Berlin
numeracy test and the wordsum test. Psychotic-like experiences were measured with
the Community Assessment of Psychic Experience (CAPE-42) scale.
Results: Psychotic-like experiences were positively correlated with a larger receptivity
toward bullshit, more ontological confabulations, and also a lower score on the CRT
but not with algorithmic task performance. In the patient group higher psychotic-like
experiences significantly correlated with higher bullshit receptivity.
Conclusion: Reduced deliberate reasoning may contribute to the formation of
delusions, and be a general thinking bias largely independent of a person’s general
intelligence. Acceptance of bullshit may be facilitated the more positive symptoms a
patient has, contributing to the maintenance of the delusions.
Keywords: delusions, schizophrenia, decision making, rationality, psychosis continuum, autism, asperger
syndrome
INTRODUCTION
Most of us have hadmoments saying silent or aloud “how the . . . can you believe in this bullshit?” Is
this person joking with me or is the personmeaning it seriously? If it is the latter, should you worry?
Given that psychotic symptoms are not just experienced by patients with a psychiatric disorder but
are also present in a larger portion of the general population would receptivity to bullshit be a
cognitive marker for bizarre thoughts and non-conventional logic?
We here investigated whether receptivity to bullshit, a tendency to confabulations, and a general
reduction in cognitive reflection are positively associated with more psychotic-like experiences.
A plethora of research has shown that mental disorders are related to failures in rationality
(Zimbardo, 1999; Adams et al., 2016), i.e., knowledge of when and how to apply deliberate
reasoning (Stanovich, 2009). A primary example is psychosis and psychosis-like experiences.
Psychotic-like experiences (PLE) are subclinical delusional ideas and perceptual disturbances, with
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psychosis being the pathological extreme (Poulton et al., 2000;
van Os et al., 2009). PLE are qualitatively similar to Symptoms
experienced by patients with psychosis but quantitatively less
severe with lower frequency, intensity and persistence. These
experiences occur in 5–8% of the general population (van
Os et al., 2009), but among adolescents the incident rate is
higher (Scott et al., 2008; van Os et al., 2009; Kelleher and
Cannon, 2011). PLE are associated with the development of
schizophrenia spectrum disorders as well as a number of other
mental health problems such as anxiety, depression, substance
abuse, self-harm and suicide risk (van Os et al., 2002; Hides
et al., 2009; Saha et al., 2011a,b). PLE can be seen as an alteration
in how one perceives and thinks about reality, and similar to
delusions, which are a cardinal feature of psychosis, they present
bizarre or abnormal thoughts and non-conventional logic. PLE
can therefore, as delusions, be seen as examples of epistemic
irrationality, although less severe.
Models Explaining the Formation of PLE
and Delusions
One model explaining positive symptoms in psychosis is the
Dual Stream Modulation failure model by Speechley and Ngan
(2008). This model looks at decision-making as a product of
the dynamic interaction between a fast, intuitive and automatic
form of processing (Stream 1) and a slower, conscious and
deliberative process (Stream 2). In scenarios where there is
more than one option available the detection of conflict tends
to shift decision-making toward Stream 2. Highly emotionally
valenced stimuli tend to shift decision-making toward Stream 1.
This model proposes that in schizophrenia there is a failure in
conflict detection and hence a reduced shift of decision-making
toward Stream 2 and an increased (emotional) shift toward
Stream 1. This aberrant interaction of the two streams facilitates
erroneous intuitive explanations to coexist with contrary logical
explanations of the same event contributing to delusions.
Another model explaining the positive symptoms of psychosis
by Moritz et al. (2017) outlines a two-stage process. Stage 1 or
the belief formation stage is how false ideas enter and dominate
consciousness. Patients tend to assign meaning and momentum
to weakly supported evidence. Patients tend to show a greater
acceptance of absurd hypotheses in psychological paradigms, i.e.,
they show a lowered decision threshold referred to as liberal
acceptance bias (Moritz andWoodward, 2004;Moritz et al., 2006,
2009, 2016; Veckenstedt et al., 2011). At stage 1 the delusion
is more like a working hypothesis, and delusions in this stage
are usually not acted upon. Stage 2, or belief maintenance stage,
consists of several factors promoting conviction (McLean et al.,
2016).
Indeed, PLE and delusions may arise through a faulty
interplay between the more rational, conscious, slow, serial,
and cognitively demanding system 2 (which promotes deliberate
reasoning), and the intuitive, fast, unconscious system 1
(responsible for intuitive thinking; Evans, 1984; Sloman, 1996;
Kahneman, 2003; Speechley and Ngan, 2008; Speechley et al.,
2013).
Further, Stanovich (2009) propose a model separating the
execution of deliberate reasoning and the knowledge of when
to apply this. In his tripartite model the reflective mind is
responsible for knowing when to apply deliberate reasoning,
while the algorithmic mind (i.e., intellectual capacity) is
responsible for the execution of reasoning.
Accordingly, a weak reflective mind can lead to impaired
conflict detection, and monitoring of ideas and beliefs. This
may lead individuals to accept questionable information, draw
premature conclusions, or fail to challenge and recalibrate their
beliefs (Balzan et al., 2016). Our proposition is therefore that PLE
and epistemic irrationality are due to a weakened reflective mind,
while algorithmic capacity may be intact and normal in persons
with PLE.
A different type of model, the diametric brain hypothesis
(Crespi and Badcock, 2008), sees psychosis and autism as
diametrically opposite phenotypes especially in the social
domain. This model suggests hypermentalizing in PLE but
hypomentalizing in autism. Of the deliberate reasoning tasks
we are using (see below) confabulating and acceptance of
bullshit might be linked to hypermentalizing and hence
autistic traits may protect against too much confabulation
and bullshit. However, a recent study showed that individuals
high on both autistics and psychotic traits had normal
mentalizing abilities, while individuals high on either measure
alone had decreased performance (Abu-Akel et al., 2015).
We therefore included a brief measure of autistic traits
in Experiment 3.
Assessing the Reflective Mind—Measuring
Deliberate Reasoning
Recently, Pennycook et al. (2015) developed a task measuring
uncritical acceptance, the bullshit receptivity task. The colloquial
term Bullshit refers to statements that are created to impress
but are not related to truth (Frankfurt, 2005). One may
want to impress others with technical or complex terms
despite insufficient knowledge (Atir et al., 2015). Bullshit is a
statement purporting to be deep and impressive but is merely
buzzwords placed together with correct syntactical structure
(Pennycook et al., 2015). The tendency to perceive such nonsense
statements as profound has been labeled “bullshit receptivity”
(BR). BR can be explained by two mechanisms. The first is
a bias to accept things at face value. The second is a lack
of ability to detect bullshit, or an error in the discovery
of meaninglessness. BR is shown to correlate positively with
supernatural beliefs, conspiracy theories and religiosity, which
is epistemic questionable faith (Pennycook et al., 2015). A
further indicator of a weak reflective mind is the tendency to
confabulate. Ontological confabulation (OC) (Lindeman et al.,
2015) is any category mistake involving property differences
between “animate” and “inanimate” or “mental” and “physical.”
One example of OC is confusing biological and psychological
phenomena such as “An evil thought is contaminated.”
Ontological confabulations are seen as a failure to reflect on and
inhibit intuitive confusions of ontological phenomena (Svedholm
and Lindeman, 2013). It has been shown that paranormal
believers mentalize matter, physicalize and biologize mental
phenomenamore than skeptics do (Lindeman and Aarnio, 2007).
One can also look at OC as a bias toward believing the literal
truth of statements. In this way, it could be related to BR, and
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indeed has been shown to correlate positively with it Pennycook
et al. (2015). A well-established measurement of the reflective
mind is the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005).
It is designed to test an individual’s ability to override an
intuitive, but mistaken response with a more analytical correct
response. The CRT has been shown to correlate negatively with
receptivity for bullshit and ontological confusion (Pennycook
et al., 2015).
Together, these three tasks serve as a measure of the reflective
mind, and can give insight into the mechanisms contributing to
PLE. It should be noted that BR and OC are lexical tasks, and
depend on verbal reflective abilities, while the CRT relies more
on reflective numeracy (Thomson and Oppenheimer, 2016). We
also included two short tests measuring verbal and numerical
abilities, the wordsum test (Malhotra et al., 2007) and the Berlin
numeracy test (Cokely et al., 2012). A fourth task that may
measure a weak reflective mind is a probabilistic inference task,
i.e., the beads task (Huq et al., 1988). Patients with psychosis
request less information before deciding, referred to as “jumping
to conclusion” bias (JtC bias).
In line with Speechley and Ngan’s (2008) Dual Processing
Modulation Failure account, we expect a high score of PLE
to correlate negatively with CRT performance. Further, by
the liberal acceptance account (Moritz and Woodward, 2004)
and the diametrical brain hypothesis (Crespi and Badcock,
2008) we expect that people with higher levels of PLE will
be more receptive to bullshit and display more ontological
confabulations. We expected no relationship between PLE
and algorithmic task performance. Experiment 1 was an
explorative study, whereas Experiment 2 set out to confirm
the findings in patients that have a diagnosis of psychosis.
Experiment 3 replicated Experiment 1 and added a measure of
autistic traits.
EXPERIMENT 1: EXPLORING REFLECTIVE
MIND MEASURES AND PSYCHOTIC
EXPERIENCES
Method Participants and Procedure
Eighty-five people (34 men) from UiT The Arctic University
of Norway and Sunnhordland Folkehøgskole participated.
The participants were undergraduate psychology students,
undergraduate law students, and undergraduate music students.
The mean age was 21 years (SD = 3.5). Participation
was anonymous, fully voluntary and with informed consent.
Participants were informed that the investigation focused on
problem solving in everyday life. The survey was implemented in
Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) and completed by participants
in a computer lab at the campus. It took ∼30min to complete.
Participants received no compensation.
Tasks and Material
Following demographic assessment participants completed three
tasks to test deliberate reasoning (i.e., their reflective mind), two
tasks to gauge their algorithmic thinking and two trials of the
fish task, which is a variant of the beads task (see below).
Deliberate Reasoning Tasks (Reflective Mind)
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is designed to test an
individual’s ability to override an intuitive but incorrect response
in order to correctly solve a mathematical problem (Toplak et al.,
2011, 2014; Thomson and Oppenheimer, 2016). An example of
an item is “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs
$1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? We used
items 2–6 from Toplak et al. (2011), and scored answers as
either correct or incorrect. Correct answers were coded as 1 and
incorrect answers as 0, resulting in a score from 0 to 5 for the 5
tasks.
Bullshit receptivity (BR) was measured with the bullshit
receptivity scale containing 10 non-meaningful items such as
“We are in the midst of a self-aware blossoming of being that will
align us with the nexus itself ” and a motivational scale with 10
meaningful sentences “All endings are also beginnings. We just
don’t know it at the time.” Pennycook et al. (2015) used a Five
Point Likert scale, but we used a 4-point scale from 1 = “not
deep at all” to 4 = “very deep meaning” to avoid people using
the middle score as a “don’t know”-option (Dolnicar and Grün,
2014).
Ontological Confabulations (OC) were measured with the 14
items from the Core Knowledge Confusions scale. Participants
were asked to rate statements such as “When summer is warm,
flowers want to bloom” on a four-point scale from 1= completely
metaphorical to 4 = completely literal. This was supplemented
with three metaphorical items like “Friends are the salt of life,”
and three literal items “Running water is fluid” (Lindeman
et al., 2015). The confabulation score is the sum of participants’
responses to the 14 Core Knowledge Confusion items. The higher
the score the more they treated those statements as literal.
Algorithmic Thinking Tasks
Participants completed a short numeracy and a short verbal
intelligence test. This controlled also for collinearity to ensure
that the measures of deliberate reasoning were separate from a
person’s IQ.
The Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely et al., 2012) uses four
mathematical tasks that become progressively more difficult.
Participants only proceeded from one question to the next item if
they answered the previous question correctly. Correct answers
were awarded 1 point and incorrect answers 0 points, for a
possible total score ranging from 0 to 4.
Wordsum is a short test of verbal intelligence (Malhotra et al.,
2007). The task presents 10 words, each with 5 alternatives
of which one is a synonym. One point was awarded for each
correctly identified synonym. It was possible for participants to
answer “I don’t know.” The final score ranges between 0 and 10
points. We applied an exclusion criterion of <3 points (chance
level is 2 out of 10 correct). No participant was excluded due to a
too low score.
The fish task (Speechley et al., 2010) was included to test
whether there is a relationship between the deliberate reasoning
tasks and a jumping to conclusion bias. The task consists of two
lakes being presented on a screen, and the participants are asked
to decide from which lake a black (b) or white (w) fish comes
from, respectively. We used two rounds with 10 draws. In round
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one the ratio of black to white fish was 80:20 in lake A and 20:80
in lake B and the sequence was bbbwbbbbwb. In round two the
ratio of black to white fish was 80:20 in lake A and 50:50 in lake
B and the sequence was wbwbbwbwwb. Participants saw one fish
at a time and could indicate from which lake the fish comes from,
or choose to see another fish before deciding. They also adjusted
two sliders to indicate the probability that the fish came from
lake A and lake B, respectively1. How many fish they required
to see before making a decision is the “draws to decision” score
(DtD). Deciding after one or two fish is considered jumping to
conclusion. Participants who did not decide on a lake after 10
draws were scored as making a decision on the 11th draw.
Finally, we measured the rate of PLE with the 20 items
from the positive scale of the CAPE-42 (Stefanis et al., 2002),
abbreviated as CAPE-P. A sample item is “Do you ever feel as
if electrical devices such as computers can influence the way you
think?” A second scale measures the distress associated with these
experiences, together the two scales produce a sum total score of
PLE. The distress scale was only used in Experiments 1 and 2.
The order of the tasks was first CRT, then BR task, OC task,
wordsum task, numeracy task, then the two rounds of the fish
task and lastly the CAPE-P.
We expected to find positive correlations between the CAPE-
P and the BR, CAPE-P and the OC as well as we expected to find a
negative correlation between draws to decision and CAPE-P, the
CRT and the CAPE-P (predictions i–iv). These four predictions
were corrected for multiple comparisons with the False discovery
rate (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).
Further, auxiliary2 predictions were a negative relationship
between CRT and BR score as well as CRT and OC; a positive
correlation between BR and OC (Pennycook et al., 2015) and a
positive correlation between the Berlin numeracy test score and
the CRT (Cokely et al., 2012; prediction iv–viii). Data analysis
was performed with JASP (JASP Team, 2017).We also performed
a regression analysis with CAPE-P score as dependent variable
and the scores from the six tasks (CRT, BR, OC, wordsum, Berlin
numeracy test, fish task’s draws to decision) as predictors. The
decision threshold from the fish task was not included.
Results
Fourteen participants received a survey version without the fish
task, and due to a technical problem their data on the CRT got
lost.
The correlation table below (Table 1) provides all 21
correlations. Prediction (i–ii): There was a significant positive
correlation between CAPE-P and BR score and CAPE-P and
the OC score, (iii) but not between CAPE-P and the draws to
decision score, i.e., the draws to decisions in the two rounds
of the fish task was not related to the number of psychotic-
like experiences. Prediction (iv–vi): There was no significant
correlation between CAPE-P and CRT or CRT and BR score,
but there was a significant negative correlation between CRT
1Some participants mixed up the side of the sliders, or did only adjust one slider.
And the decision threshold was not correlated with any other measurement, for
clarity we do not include it in the Result section.
2These are exempt from FDR correction, reducing the Type II error. We thank one
of the reviewers for this advice.
and OC score. Prediction (vii) was met, i.e., the OC score had
a significant positive correlation with the BR score. Prediction
(viii) was met, i.e., the Berlin numeracy score had a significant
positive correlation with the CRT score. In addition, we noted
that the wordsum score was significantly negatively correlated to
the BR score. The wordsum score and the numeracy score were
not correlated with the CAPE-P. We noted also an unpredicted
result, a higher score in the wordsum task had a significant
positive correlation with more draws to decision and a reduced
JtC bias, respectively.
A stepwise linear regression for the CAPE-P score yielded two
significant predictors: bullshit receptivity score [t(84) = 2.038,
p= 0.045, CI:.016–1.275] and confabulation score [t(84) = 2.124,
p= 0.037, CI:.710–21.619]. This regression explained 14% of the
variance in the CAPE-P scores (p= 0.002).
Discussion
We found a positive correlation between a person’s receptivity to
bullshit, ontological confabulation and the number of PLE. We
did not find a relationship between the CRT and PLE among
healthy young persons, nor was there a negative relationship
between the CRT and the bullshit receptivity score, but there was
a negative relationship between the CRT and the confabulation
score. Since the bullshit receptivity score and the confabulation
score were positively correlated, this suggests that these two
tasks measure one aspect of the reflective mind and the CRT
another aspect, i.e., lexical and numerical deliberate reasoning,
respectively. Good verbal intelligence is necessary but not
sufficient for the BR, OC and fish task. The CRT score might
depend on numerical ability (Thomson and Oppenheimer, 2016)
and not only on the reflectivemind. The two algorithmic thinking
tasks, wordsum and numeracy, are unrelated to each other. We
found no relationship between the draws to decision in the fish
task and PLE. This is not surprising since we used only two
rounds, and it came after a series of other tasks. The task is
prone to misunderstanding of the instructions (Balzan et al.,
2012) and higher verbal intelligence was here associated with
a lower JtC bias. In addition, recent meta-analyses have found
only weak support for the JtC bias and PLE in non-deluded
persons (Ross et al., 2015; Dudley et al., 2016), presumably due
to motivational issues/noise in the healthy controls (Moutoussis
et al., 2011).
EXPERIMENT 2: DELIBERATE REASONING
IN PATIENTS WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA
In Experiment 1 we found that the number of PLE and
associated stress were positively related to a person’s acceptance
of nonsense statements and interpretation of metaphorical
statements as literal. The difference between people with PLE
and schizophrenia is foremost quantitative (more PLE) and then
becomes qualitatively different. As such, a weakened reflective
mind may be a cognitive marker for symptom severity. Hence,
we wanted to see whether symptom severity among patients
with a diagnosis of psychosis is related to bullshit receptivity
and ontological confabulation. We expected to find a positive
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TABLE 1 | Pearson correlation among the six tasks and the CAPE-P score.
Confabulation
score
CRT score Berlin Numeracy test Wordsum score DtD /JtC CAPE_P + distress
Bullshit receptivity score Pearson’s r 0.332 −0.151 0.099 −0.266 −0.042 0.299
p-value 0.002 0.208 0.365 0.014 0.726 0.006*
Confabulation score Pearson’s r — −0.301 −0.139 −0.162 −0.169 0.305
p-value — 0.011 0.205 0.138 0.158 0.005*
CRT_score, n = 71 Pearson’s r — 0.287 0.028 −0.005 −0.123
p-value — 0.015 0.814 0.965 0.305
Numeracy test Pearson’s r — 0.056 0.097 −0.029
p-value — 0.608 0.420 0.793
Wordsum score Pearson’s r — 0.249 −0.118
p-value — 0.036 0.282
Draws to Decision (JtC bias), n = 71 Pearson’s r — −0.151
p-value — 0.207t
Note that for CRT and for DtD N = 71 only, FDR corrected p-values are 0.012 for *, and P = 0.276 for t in bold: correlations with puncorrected < 0.05.
correlation between symptom severity and acceptance of bullshit,




Thirty seven people3, whereof 19 were patients took part.
The patients were recruited from a database of participants
derived from former studies carried out at the University
Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf (Germany). They were
provided information about the experiment and the link to
the survey via email, i.e., we did not know who of the
contacted patients participated. Inclusion criteria were a lifetime
diagnosis of psychosis or schizoaffective disorder, age of 18–
65 years, informed consent, and (because all assessments were
conducted online) availability of a web-enabled smartphone
or a personal computer with internet access throughout
assessment (Lüdtke et al., 2017). Contacted patients were
currently not in an acute stage but we do not know whether
they were currently unwell4. Eighteen people of the same
age as the patient group were recruited through snowballing.
Exclusion criterion was any mental disorder diagnosis, but
we did not pre-select for participants with a low PLE. After
completing the tasks, participants could watch a video of the
northern lights with relaxing music. No monetary incentives
were given.
Tasks and Material
The tasks were the same as in Experiment 1 except that the
fish task was not included. The survey was implemented using
Qualtrics and it took∼20min to complete.
3Fifty-four participants started the survey, however there were 17 dropouts due to
not completing the survey.
4We think it is unlikely that currently unwell patients or patients in remission
would have completed the tasks and responded to the email, respectively.
Results
The groups were well matched by age, sex, and education. As can
be seen in Table 2, they differed in their CAPE-P score but not in
the deliberate reasoning or algorithmic thinking tasks.
Within the patient group we found a significant strong
positive correlation between CAPE-P and BR score: r = 0.512,
p = 0.025, but not for the OC score: r = 0.199, p = 0.415. The
CRT score was not significantly related to the CAPE-P score,
r = 0.003, p = 0.99. As found in Experiment 1, there was a
significant high correlation between the CRT and the numeracy
test score among the 19 patients, r = 0.647, p = 0.003. BR score
and OC score were not related, r = −0.052, p = 0.834 (see
Table 3).
Discussion
Patients with at least one previous psychotic episode reported
more PLE and associated distress than age-matched controls.
Within the patient group severity of symptoms correlated
positively with BR score but did not correlate with the OC score,
CRT score, or reduced algorithmic thinking as measured with
the wordsum task and the numeracy task. Further, patients did
not differ from controls on any of these tasks which might be
due to our small sample size. A clear limitation is that we had
no information on the duration, medication or comorbidity in
the patient sample. These findings complement Experiment 1, as
PLE positively correlates with BR in the patient sample but BR is
not a sensitive enough measurement to distinguish patients from
controls. However, BR and not OC correlated with severity of the
symptoms.
EXPERIMENT 3: DELIBERATE REASONING
ALONG THE AUTISTIC-PSYCHOSIS
CONTINUUM
In Experiments 1 and 2 we used only the positive subscale of
the CAPE-42. Notably, the OC is a mentalizing task, and the
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TABLE 2 | Demographics and task performance between controls and patients.
Demographics/tasks Controls (N = 18, 11 female) Patients (N = 19, 13 female) P Cohen’s d
Age 42.9 ± 15.5 44.5 ± 11.2 0.714 0.122
Education 3.0 ± 0.84 2.53 ± 0.84 0.096 0.563
CAPE-P + distress* 35.83 ± 6.32 51.32 ± 16.49 < 0.001 1.24
Bullshit Receptivity 19.33 ± 5.22 17.68 ± 6.55 0.405 0.277
Ontological Confabulation 32.94 ± 7.53 31.37 ± 8.19 0.547 0.2
Cognitive Reflection Test 2.83 ± 1.72 2.32 ± 1.25 0.301 0.345
Wordsum score 7.83 ± 1.43 8.63 ± 1.74 0.137 0.501
Berlin numeracy score 1.22 ± 1.35 1.05 ± 1.35 0.705 0.125
*Welch test, data is M ± SD.
TABLE 3 | Pearson correlation between the five tasks and the CAPE-P in 19 patients.
Confabulation score CRT_score Berlin Numeracy test Wordsum score CAPE_P + distress
Bullshit receptivity score Pearson’s r −0.052 −0.293 −0.142 −0.245 0.512
p-value 0.834 0.224 0.561 0.312 0.025*
Confabulation score Pearson’s r — −0.224 −0.087 −0.372 0.199
p-value — 0.357 0.723 0.117 0.415
CRT_score Pearson’s r — 0.647 0.414 0.003
p-value — 0.003 0.078 0.990
Numeracy test Pearson’s r — 0.268 −0.095
p-value — 0.266 0.698
Wordsum score Pearson’s r — 0.041
p-value — 0.867
In bold: correlations with puncorrected < 0.05, * FDR corrected p = 0.05.
BR might be so too, i.e., what is an agent telling me? Additional
autistic traits might counterbalance such hypermentalizing in
persons with many PLE. Indeed, a recent study found that
healthy participants scoring high on the CAPE-P and also scoring
high on the autism spectrum quotient (AQ) performed as good
as participants scoring low on both scales in a perspective
taking task (Abu-Akel et al., 2015). Hence, we reasoned that the
number of autistic traits is negatively correlated with bullshit
receptivity and ontological confabulations. Since the CRT is not
a mentalizing task, we did not expect a positive correlation
between autistic traits and CRT. To gauge depressive tendencies




Eighty-one participants from UiT and NTNU took part, many
were psychology undergraduates. Five participants had to be
excluded due to answering either all of the three catch questions
(see below) positively or had a wordsum score below 3. Thirteen
participants did not do the confabulation task, wordsum task,
Berlin numeracy task, and the CRT. The analysis for CAPE, AQ,
and BR is based on N = 76 (54 women), whereas the analysis for
5Participants with high scores on the CAPE-P and or AQmay also have depressive
symptoms.
the confabulation task and CRT is based on N = 63 (46 women).
The mean age (N = 76) was 23.8 years (SD= 2.87, range 19–35).
Tasks and Material
In Experiment 3 we introduced two new measures: the 10-item
Autism spectrum quotient (AQ-10, Booth et al., 2013) and the
25-item Systematizing quotient (SQ) (Wakabayashi et al., 2006)
to see if these traits could serve as a protective factor on deliberate
reasoning tasks in healthy controls.
The experiment was done in two parts. Participants first
completed the BR task, then the 10-item version of the AQ
(Booth et al., 2013), the 25-item version of the SQ (Wakabayashi
et al., 2006), and the CAPE-42 with three catch items (Moritz
et al., 2013) interspersed but without the distress scale. These
items were presented in a custom-written python script. Then,
participants opened the browser and completed the CRT, OC
task, the wordsum task, and the numeracy task in Qualtrics.
All testing occurred in a computer lab at the campus and took
∼35min. Participants received no compensation.
We predicted a positive correlation between the BR score
and the CAPE-P, and between the OC score and CAPE-P, but
a negative correlation between AQ and the BR score and the
OC score, respectively. These four predictions were corrected for
multiple comparisons with the FDR. We had no prediction for
the two other subscales of the CAPE-42: the depressive (CAPE-
D) and negative (CAPE-N) subscale. We further expected that
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TABLE 4 | Pearson correlation between the five tasks and the five questionnaire scales.











Bullshit score (N = 76) r 0.339 −0.075 −0.230 −0.067 0.230 0.113 −0.135 −0.254 0.041
p-value 0.007 0.557 0.070 0.599 0.046* 0.333 0.246 0.027* 0.725
Confabulation (N = 63) r — −0.215 −0.343 −0.127 0.234 0.106 −0.129 −0.083 −0.118
p-value — 0.091 0.006 0.320 0.065* 0.408 0.315 0.519 0.358
CRT (N = 63) r — 0.466 0.058 −0.230 −0.057 0.099 −0.044 0.130
p-value — <0.001 0.649 0.070 0.658 0.442 0.731 0.311
Numeracy test (N = 63) r — −0.027 0.024 0.081 0.328 0.091 0.231
p-value — 0.831 0.852 0.527 0.009 0.480 0.068
Wordsum_score
(N = 63)
r — −0.088 −0.038 0.072 −0.198 0.191
p-value — 0.493 0.766 0.576 0.121 0.133
CAPE-42 positive
(N = 76)
r — 0.387 0.387 0.062 −0.022
p-value — <0.001 <0.001 0.594 0.850
CAPE-42 depressive
(N = 76)
r — 0.650 0.117 0.307
p-value — <0.001 0.316 0.007
CAPE-42 negative
(N = 76)
r — 0.252 0.086





In bold: correlations with puncorrected < 0.05,
*FDR corrected P = 0.09. AQ-10 … autism quotient 10-item version, SQ-25 … systemizing quotient 25-item version.
the CRT score is positively correlated with the Berlin numeracy
score, and that the wordsum score is negatively correlated with
the BR score. We predicted a positive correlation between the SQ
and the numeracy score (Baron-Cohen et al., 2007).
Results
As predicted (Table 4) we found a positive correlation between
the CAPE-P and the BR score, r = 0.23, and the CAPE-P and the
OC score, r = 0.234 but neither reached statistical significance,
FDR corrected p’s= 0.09. The AQ was negatively correlated with
the BR score, r = −0.254, FDR corrected p = 0.09; but the AQ
was not related to the confabulation score, r=−0.083, p= 0.519.
Of the auxiliary predictions we found that the BR score and
the OC score were significantly positively correlated, r = 0.339,
p = 0.007, as was the CRT and the numeracy score, r = 0.46,
p < 0.001. Contrary to prediction, the wordsum score was not
correlated with the BR score, r = −0.067, p = 0.599. The SQ
had a positive but non-significant correlation with the numeracy
score, r = 0.231, p = 0.068 and a significant positive correlation
with the CAPE-D, r = 0.307, p = 0.007. After dichotomizing
participants (median split) into low and high AQ, and low and
high CAPE-P, respectively, there were only six participants that
scored above average on both AQ and CAPE-P; this did not allow
us to do an analysis as Abu-Akel et al. did.
A multiple linear regression was performed to predict CAPE-
P based on the five tasks. The model had an R2 of 0.166,
F(5, 62) = 2.262, p = 0.06. The strongest predictor was the CRT
score, t = −2.18, p = 0.033. A similar model for AQ yielded
an R2 of 0.143, F(5, 62) = 1.896, p = 0.109 with the BR score as
the strongest predictor, t = 0.2.329, p = 0.023. Since there is no
causal relationship, we also looked at which of the five scales from
the questionnaires would predict receptivity to bullshit and the
ontological confabulation score, respectively. A multiple linear
regression for bullshit receptivity based on the CAPE-P, CAPE-
D, CAPE-N, AQ, and SQ had an R2 of 0.196, F(2, 75) = 3.421,
p= 0.008. Both the CAPE-P (t= 2.359, p= 0.021) and the CAPE-
N (t = −2.405, p = 0.019) were significant coefficients. The AQ
was a near-significant coefficient, t = −1.903, p = 0.061 whereas
the SQ was non-significant, p = 0.919. For the confabulation
score, the model had an R2 of 0.169, F(5, 62) = 2.313, p = 0.055,
and only the CAPE-N (t = −2.477, p = 0.016) was a significant
predictor.
Discussion
Those that reported many psychotic-like experiences classified
more nonsense statements as profound and metaphorical
statements as literal. This was not driven by verbal intelligence as
we found no relationship between the wordsum score and the BR
or OC score. Notably, participants with a low score on the AQ
were more susceptible to bullshit than those who had a higher
AQ score but this was not the case for the SQ. We used only
the 10-item version of the AQ. Only very few participants had a
score of five or more on the AQ. Similarly, only few participants
had extreme PLE scores. This may explain why we could not
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find that having a high AQ and high CAPE-P resulted in a
“normal” performance (Abu-Akel et al., 2015). Still, AQ but not
SQ correlated with BR. Neither of those two scales correlated with
the OC score supporting Pennycook et al. (2015) finding that
bullshit receptivity is separate from ontological confabulations.
Notably, in the regression analysis CAPE-P, CAPE-N, and AQ
predicted BR but the OC score was not predicted by CAPE-P
or the AQ. Also, a high score on systemizing did not prevent
receptivity to bullshit or ontological confabulation. Finally, these
results indicate that there is not a simple diametrical relationship
between autism and psychosis either (Russell-Smith et al., 2013).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our hypothesis was that psychotic-like experiences are related
to the individual’s weakened ability to know when to use
deliberate reasoning. We found a positive correlation between
bullshit receptivity and psychotic-like experiences, and a positive
correlation between ontological confabulation and psychotic-like
experiences. However, the correlations were not very high but
were consistent in their magnitude and direction (positive) across
the three experiments. Notably, a standard test for deliberate
reasoning, the CRT, was not consistently found to be associated
with PLE, it was negatively correlated only in Experiment 3.
The CRT was positively associated with the Berlin numeracy
task (see also Toplak et al., 2011). As predicted, performance
in the algorithmic tasks showed no significant relationship with
the number of psychotic-like experiences. This is an important
finding because this indicates that it is not the general ability
to think that is aberrant, but rather a metacognitive problem of
knowing when to use deliberate reasoning especially in lexical
tasks.
Comparing patients to healthy controls yielded no group
differences in any of the three deliberate reasoning measures.
However, within the small patient group we did find a
large correlation between bullshit receptivity and psychotic-
like experiences. Future studies should therefore investigate if
bullshit receptivity varies with symptom severity. Notably, it
is particularly these nonsense statements that were related to
PLE. Hypermentalizing, common in psychosis, cannot solely
explain it. The ontological confabulation task is also a task
involving mentalizing but did not correlated with PLE in the
patient sample nor was the OC score predicted by the CAPE-
P or AQ score (Experiment 3). The CRT was not consistently
linked to PLE either, thus bullshit receptivity might evoke a
mentalizing part that is unique and susceptible to PLE. This may
also explain the negative relationship between autistic traits and
bullshit receptivity in Experiment 3. Since we did not find this
for the ontological confabulation task, nor any relationship with
systematizing, future studies should investigate if scoring high
on AQ serves as a protective factor for bullshit receptivity for
individuals also high on CAPE-P.
Regarding our deliberate reasoning measurements, it should
be noted that there are twomechanisms that need to be separated.
One is the previously mentioned liberal acceptance bias and the
other is the ability to detect and override an intuitive response
(knowing when deliberate reasoning is necessary). Bullshit as an
example can be separated into a bias toward saying all items have
a deep meaning (liberal acceptance), or you can look at the ability
to separate between control items and bullshit items (conflict
detection and override). Results from a signal detection theory
approach (SupplementaryMaterial) does indicate that the CAPE-
P correlates both with a bias to assign statements’ profoundness
and one’s ability to discriminate between bullshit and control
items (named motivational items in Pennycook et al., 2015).
Also, ontological confabulation is related to relying on intuition
and is in large part a failure to inhibit and override intuitive
thinking. Svedholm and Lindeman (2013) showed that increasing
cognitive load (making people rely more on intuition) increased
ontological confabulation. From our three experiments it seems
that persons scoring high on psychotic-like experiences have a
more liberal acceptance of statements, which partly supports
the dual stream modulation failure theory (Speechley and Ngan,
2008).
Thus it seems that a liberal acceptance and the failure to
know when to engage in deliberate reasoning contribute to
psychotic-like experience. A failure to engage in deliberate
reasoning can lead to both more ontological confabulations and
a larger acceptance of sentences without any deeper meaning,
commonly known as bullshit. Subsequent thought processes or
beliefs can build upon these faulty assumptions, without the
awareness of the individual, also the individual is less likely
to later correct these mistakes. In this way, faulty beliefs and
assumptions will be accepted, and further beliefs can build upon
false assumptions and mistakes can accumulate. Both bullshit
receptivity and ontological confabulations have previously shown
positive correlations with epistemically questionable beliefs
such as beliefs in the paranormal, supernatural, religion and
conspiracy theories (Lindeman et al., 2015; Pennycook et al.,
2015), while the Cognitive reflection test and other heuristics and
bias tasks (Toplak et al., 2011) have shown negative correlations
with these beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2015). Furthermore, religious
believers have shown similar levels of delusional ideation as
patients with psychosis, and they also showed a jumping to
conclusion bias (Lim et al., 2012). It might be that bullshit
receptivity and ontological confabulation share a common
mechanism. This mechanism might also be involved in the
emergence and maintenance of religious beliefs and psychosis,
respectively. Attributional mechanisms (Bentall et al., 1994),
Theory of Mind deficits (Frith, 1992), trauma (Saha et al.,
2011a,b,c) and other less well studied factors may differentiate
between religious believers and persons with psychosis.
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
To our knowledge our study is the first that examines the
link between deliberate reasoning measures and psychotic-
like experiences in healthy controls and patients. It warrants
replication and also a longitudinal investigation to differentiate
whether a weakened reflective mind contributes to e.g., the
formation of delusions or its maintenance. Experiment 2 had low
power due to small sample size, which might be why we did not
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find any group differences on our deliberate reasoning measures.
Also, we have limited knowledge of the mental history of both
our patients and control group. Future research should also
include other groups like people with a diagnosis of autism, OCD,
or depression to investigate the specificity of the correlations
found here. Training the reflective mind, as does metacognitive
therapy, should reduce the receptivity to bullshit, ontological
confabulations and strengthen performance in the cognitive
reflection test.
CONCLUSION
We found that psychotic-like experiences were positively
correlated with bullshit receptivity and ontological
confabulations, but not with performance in the wordsum
task or in the Berlin numeracy task. This indicates that
psychotic-like experiences are related to a weakened
reflective mind and not to a weakened algorithmic mind.
Thus, a likely contributor to psychosis is poorer reflective
reasoning.
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